Using a sample of 56 companies going public in 1996-2000 in which top executives received hot initial public offering (IPO) allocations from the bookrunner, a practice known as spinning, we examine the consequences of spinning. These IPOs had first-day returns that were, on average, 23% higher than similar IPOs. The profits collected by these executives were only a small fraction of the incremental amount of money left on the table by their companies when they went public. These companies were dramatically less likely to switch investment bankers in a follow-on offer: only 6% of issuers whose executives were spun switched underwriters, whereas 31% of other issuers switched. These findings suggest that the spinning of executives accomplished its goal of affecting corporate decisions.
Introduction
Spinning is the allocation by underwriters of the shares of hot initial public offerings (IPOs) to company executives in order to influence their decisions in the hiring of investment bankers and/or the pricing of their own company's initial public offering. The term spinning refers to the fact that the shares are often immediately sold in the aftermarket or "spun" for a quick profit, and an IPO is termed "hot" if it is expected to jump in price as soon as it starts trading.
IPO spinning is one of the four scandals associated with IPOs that have been the subject of regulatory settlements following the collapse of the technology stock bubble in 2000-2002. 1 The other three practices, laddering, analyst conflicts of interest, and the exchange of soft dollar commission business in return for IPO allocations, are examined either theoretically or empirically by Hao (2007) , Cliff and Dennis (2004), and Reuter (2006) , respectively. Although spinning has attracted much regulatory and legal attention, resulting in large settlements and the prosecution of several executives, the effect of spinning on corporate actions has not been examined in a systematic manner because of the lack of publicly available data on which executives were being spun. Only Loughran and Ritter (2004) discuss spinning in the academic financial literature, although Maynard (2002) and Griffin (2004) discuss the legal issues.
In the IPO literature, the issue of IPO underpricing and its time-series variation is of considerable interest. In particular, the average first day return increased from 7% during 1980-1989 to 15% during 1990-1998 and then exploded to more than 65% during the 1999-2000 bubble period, before falling back to 12% during [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . This variation has been the subject of study in Loughran and Ritter (2004) , who propose a changing issuer objective function hypothesis, which consists of two parts. The first part, the analyst lust hypothesis, has been tested and confirmed by Cliff and Dennis (2004) . However, the second part, the spinning hypothesis, has not been tested empirically, mainly due to the lack of data.
In this paper, we fill this void. For our empirical analysis, we use data gathered from court cases, the media, and documents requested through the Freedom of Information Act. From these sources, we obtain data on 146 officers and directors at 56 companies that were recipients of hot initial public offering (IPO) allocations. All of these companies were taken public by Deutsche
Morgan Grenfell (DMG), Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), and Salomon Smith Barney (SSB) during 1996-2000.
There is evidence in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) settlements and
Congressional testimony that Piper Jaffray, Goldman Sachs, and other investment banking firms also engaged in spinning. 2 Our empirical analysis, however, is restricted to IPOs for which DMG, CSFB, or SSB was the bookrunner. 3 The reason that we impose this restriction is that the companies identified in press reports and settlements suffer from a selection bias, frequently containing examples of prominent executives at well-known companies. In contrast, the data for the three investment banking firms that we focus on is systematic, composed of all of the executives who were being systematically spun by CSFB as of March 21, 2000; executives who were being spun by CSFB and lived in Silicon Valley, including those being spun after March 21, 2000; or those being spun by SSB at any time during 1996-2000. For each executive that had a brokerage account with the SSB unit in charge of spinning, we have data on the allocations to each executive for 48 IPOs.
We estimate the effect of spinning on IPO underpricing and the awarding of future investment banking mandates. The effect of spinning on IPO underpricing is a direct test of the spinning hypothesis posited in Loughran and Ritter (2004) , which states that executives who receive side payments from underwriters put less emphasis on maximizing the proceeds from their IPO, resulting in the IPO being more underpriced. We find that holding everything else constant, IPOs in which the executives are being spun are 23% more underpriced (e.g., 43% vs. 20%). The average dollar value of this incremental underpricing, the incremental money left on the table, is approximately $17 million, where money left on the table is the underpricing per share multiplied by the number of shares issued. The average first-day profit received from hot IPO allocations by the executives of a company being spun is $1.3 million. The ratio of these numbers indicates that only 8% of the incremental amount of money left on the table flows back to the executives being spun.
The effect of spinning on subsequent investment banking mandates relates to the literature that asks why firms do or do not switch underwriters (Dunbar (2000) , Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) , Burch, Nanda, and Warther (2005) , and Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006, 2009) ).
This literature has focused on performance dissatisfaction, graduation to a more prestigious underwriter, and analyst coverage reasons as factors that affect switching decisions. We add another reason, the co-opting of executive decision-makers, to this list. We find that companies with executives who are being spun are dramatically less likely to switch underwriters for their first seasoned equity offering. For companies not being spun, the probability of switching underwriters is 31%. For companies being spun, the probability of switching is only 6%.
More generally, this paper presents evidence on the economic consequences of an agency problem arising from the delegation of decision-making to corporate managers. Rarely, however, are there direct measures of the benefits received by executives and the costs imposed on other shareholders as a result of actions that provide personal benefits to top executives. In this paper, we are able to calculate the costs and benefits of spinning.
spinning. 6 Another Qwest executive, Executive Vice President Marc Weisberg, agreed to plead guilty in 2005 to criminal charges regarding the undisclosed receipt of hot IPO shares.
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With bookbuilt IPOs, if there is excess demand at the offer price the book runner has discretion in the allocation of shares. 8 Although there are typically discussions of an expected offer price at the time that an issuing firm chooses a lead underwriter, the final offer price is not set until the pricing meeting, which typically occurs the afternoon before trading commences. From an underwriter's point of view, the determination of the final offer price is based on the competition between two opposing forces. On the one hand, underwriters prefer a high offer price because it yields a higher gross spread in dollar terms. 9 On the other hand, a low offer price reduces the risk of an unsuccessful placement. More importantly, underwriters can allocate these underpriced shares to investors in exchange for commission business, to executives to sway their decision in choosing which investment banking firm to hire, or the shares can be allocated by the firm itself through a "friends and family" program.
When shares are allocated to executives for spinning or to individuals through a friends and family program, there is an opportunity cost to the underwriter because it does not have the ability to collect soft dollars in return for underpriced IPO allocations. (Soft dollars are the commissions paid by institutional investors that are in excess of direct execution costs.) These soft dollars, paid by rentseeking institutional investors, create an incentive for the underwriter to underprice IPOs, and to attract IPOs that will be severely underpriced (Fulghieri and Spiegel (1993) , Loughran and Ritter (2002) ). Attracting underpriced IPOs is one of the reasons that underwriters are willing to incur the opportunity cost of allocating some IPO shares for spinning and friends and family programs.
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) argue that friends and family programs create an incentive for issuing firm decision-makers to agree to leave money on the table. They argue that IPO underpricing was higher than it otherwise would have been in the late 1990s because friends and family shares became a larger fraction of the offerings, and issuing firm executives did not want to risk disappointing these investors with a first-day price drop.
Theoretical models of IPO underpricing can be categorized on the basis of whether or not there is an agency problem between issuers and underwriters. Non-agency theories explain IPO underpricing using a framework whereby investors have to be convinced to buy IPOs by being given an inducement in the form of underpriced shares. Agency theories, in contrast, assume that there is more underpricing than necessary to induce investors to purchase IPOs. Baron and Holmstrom (1980) , Baron (1982) , Loughran and Ritter (2002 , 2004 ), and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003 all argue that underwriters want to underprice IPOs. These theories do not explain why issuing firms would hire an underwriter that has a reputation for ex post taking advantage of its informational advantage or its bargaining power at the pricing meeting, with one exception. Loughran and Ritter (2004) provide an explanation for why issuing companies would hire an underwriter that is expected to leave more money on the table than necessary to complete the IPO.
They posit that the issuer's objective function has three components: It is worth noting that in the survey of 336 CFOs who attempted to take their companies public in 2000 -2002 , Brau and Fawcett (2006 report in their Table IV that 8.5% of CFOs considered the underwriter's reputation for spinning as an important consideration in selecting a lead underwriter. Also, 6% of respondents in their Table V were of the opinion that the underpricing of their IPO was affected by the desire of underwriters to make spinning possible.
There is a further implication of the spinning hypothesis: side payments offered by underwriters create an incentive for issuers to seek, rather than avoid, underwriters with a reputation for severe underpricing. The more hot IPOs that are being underwritten by a given investment banker, the more are the number of shares available to allocate to the executives being spun. This logic would predict that issuers would also seek out underwriters with a large market share, resulting in "the rich getting richer." Consistent with the desire of issuers whose executives are being spun to seek an underwriter with many underpriced IPOs to allocate, Hoberg (2007) documents persistent patterns with some underwriters having more underpricing than others, and with these high underpricing underwriters gaining market share.
Spinning may be used by the underwriter to acquire IPO mandates and influence IPO pricing, but it can also be used as part of a long term business strategy with a given company to attract future investment banking mandates. As stated in the documents that we quote in Appendix A-1 concerning the underwriter's motivation for spinning, underwriters want executives to steer future investment banking business to them and the underwriters considered ways to reduce or eliminate IPO allocations to executives who changed employment or are no longer influential. This suggests that companies whose executives are receiving hot IPO allocations from a given underwriter are more likely to hire this underwriter in future deals, leading to our second testable hypothesis: Appendix Table A -2 provides a list of the data sources and a detailed description of the variables used in our analysis. In Appendix Table A-3, we list the 56 companies for which executives were being spun. We also list the names and titles of the 146 executives being spun, and, where available, the number of IPOs received, the first-day profits, and their priority for being spun. IPOs. Of these, 15 companies went public in the pre-bubble period, while 41 companies went public in the bubble period, suggesting that spinning was more prevalent in the bubble period.
Description of the sample
The patterns across the subperiods are somewhat mixed due to the influence of two outliers.
AT&T Wireless, an SSB IPO, and VA Linux, a CSFB IPO, both of which are classified as non- (not including the overallotment option, whose inclusion boosts the total amount of money left on the table to over $1 billion). 16 To reduce the effects of outliers, we Winsorize the first-day returns at the 1st and 99 th percentiles, using the return distribution for all 2,285 IPOs in the 1996-2000 period.
In Table 1 , univariate sorts of spinning vs. nonspinning IPOs show that spinning firms are younger, smaller, and more likely to be backed by a venture capitalist. The sorts also show that spinning firms are more likely to have an offer price that is revised upward from the midpoint of the file price range and to have a higher level of underpricing.
Further details on spinning
Of the 56 IPOs for which executives were being spun, we have data on the first-day profits of the executives for 36 of them. Table 2 provides summary statistics for these 36 IPOs. Panel A reports statistics for 20 companies for which CSFB was spinning the executives, and Panel B reports statistics for 16 companies for which SSB was spinning the executives. The averages in Table 2 are calculated using the company as a unit.
Of the executives that are being spun at a given company, as a group they averaged first-day profits of $1,253,000 ($1,691,000 at CSFB and $705,000 at SSB), shared by an average of about three executives. Our SSB numbers are lower bounds, however, because we have data on allocations from only 48 IPOs, and the true numbers may be similar to those from CSFB.
In the most extreme cases, 16 executives from a single firm (Qwest Communications) received a total of at least 164 IPO allocations from SSB, generating an aggregate of $8.03 million in first-day profits, and 12 executives from another firm (Phone.com) received a total of 651 IPO allocations from CSFB, generating an aggregate of $9.30 million in first-day profits.
Panel B of Table 2 shows that for SSB, the average period over which an individual executive was spun equals 2.2 years, in spite of the cessation of spinning in 2001. The extended spinning periods suggest that underwriters viewed spinning as an important activity aimed at facilitating a long-term relationship with corporate clients.
Further Details on the executives being spun
If the spinning of executives is designed to influence corporate decisions, then more influential executives should receive greater spinning profits. Table 3 presents summary statistics sorted by the position held by executives being spun. We restrict the sample in Table 3 to the 36 companies for which we have the number of IPOs allocated to each executive. Since some executives assume multiple titles, we categorize the executives on the basis of their highest position. We order the titles from highest to lowest as Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chairman of the Board, President, Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Other Executives, and Director.
Panel A of Table 3 shows that of the 54 executives from 20 companies who were being spun by CSFB during 2000, 16 are CEOs. Panel B shows that of the 58 executives from 16 companies who were being spun by SSB during 1996 to 2000, 14 are CEOs. In both Panels A and B, the CEOs on average received more first-day profits from their IPO allocations than did less influential executives. Taking a weighted average of the two panels, in Panel C we report that the mean first-day profit is $519,598 for the 30 CEOs being spun, and $360,005 for the 82 other officers and directors being spun, for which we have allocation data.
The results in Table 3 suggest that executives receive IPO allocations based on their position in the firm. Consistent with this, for the DMG and CSFB IPOs listed in Appendix Table A-3, the executives for which we have spinning priority codes have a mean of 2.04 for the 24 CEOs with this information, and a mean of 2.87 for the 31 vice presidents, CFOs, and Chief Technology officers. A priority code of 1 is the highest priority and a code of 4 is the lowest. In other words, the benefit that executives receive from underwriters depends on how much power or influence they have regarding the firm's financial decision-making. This pattern is consistent with the motivations for spinning shown in the quotations in Appendix A-1: underwriters want to influence those with the most say in the firm regarding investment banking decisions, in order to extract the most return out of this investment.
An alternative explanation for the greater profits of CEOs is that they were wealthier individuals, and thus received bigger IPO allocations for this reason. Inconsistent with this explanation, however, is that CSFB's Friend of Frank accounts required the same deposit for all account holders, irrespective of their wealth, and that all executives with the same priority code received the same number of shares in a given IPO. Furthermore, none of the documents that we have seen relate the share allocations to the account size, although the title and company affiliation are always listed.
The Effect of Spinning on IPO Underpricing

OLS regressions for the spinning sample
To estimate the quantitative effect of spinning on IPO underpricing, Table 4 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in which the level of underpricing (the percentage first-day return from the offer price to the closing price, Winsorized at the 1% and 99%iles) is the dependent variable. We use the firm characteristic variables ln(assets), ln(1+age), a tech dummy, an internet dummy, and a venture capital dummy as control variables. In addition, we include share overhang, defined as the ratio of retained shares to the public float (shares issued), as an additional control variable (see Bradley and Jordan (2002) where e i is the residual for IPO i. This specification is similar to that used by Cliff and Denis (2004) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) , among others.
In rows 1, 2, and 3 of Table 4 , regression results using the sample of 196 IPOs from 1996-2000 underwritten by DMG, CSFB, and SSB and meeting our sample selection criteria are reported.
The only difference among the three rows is that row 2 includes an all-star analyst coverage dummy and row 3 includes an additional spin dummy. The coefficient on the all-star coverage dummy does not seem to be affected by adding the spin dummy in row 3. The coefficient of 22.68 (t= 1.96) on the spin dummy indicates that, everything else the same, the first day return was 22.68% higher when the executives of the issuing firm were spun. The coefficient on the all-star dummy of 9.89 (t= 1.03)
indicates that all-star analyst coverage is associated with 9.89% greater underpricing, although the effect is smaller and less significant than the magnitudes reported in Cliff and Denis (2004) and in Table 5 in the next sub-section of this paper.
In row 4, only IPOs from 1996 to 1998 are used. For this subperiod, the coefficient on the spin dummy variable is 17.42 (t= 2.76), suggesting that IPOs in which the executives were being spun had first-day returns that were 17.42% higher. Since the average underpricing during 1996-1998 for this sample was 16.5%, the 23.5% of the IPOs with executives being spun were underpriced substantially more than other IPOs from these underwriters. 18 We use a dummy variable to proxy for spinning status instead of a continuous variable because a continuous variable based on the ex-post first day profit suffers from look-ahead bias. Since the spinning decision is made on a yes or no basis and the exact profit from spinning is not known at the time of decision, a dummy variable is more appropriate.
19 Especially during 1999-2000, some IPOs used what was called a "walkup strategy" in which the file price was set low, with the expectation of an upward revision in order to create the impression of a "hot issue."
In row 5, IPOs from the bubble period of 1999 to 2000 are used. For this subperiod, the coefficient on the spin dummy variable is 26.36, indicating that IPOs for which there was spinning had first-day returns that were 26.36% higher. The coefficient has a t-stat of 1.71, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. This lower significance level in the bubble subperiod is due to the high standard errors, which are approximately 2.5 times as large as for the pre-bubble period, in spite of a sample size that is almost 90% higher (128 vs. 68 IPOs). This reflects the much higher variance of first-day returns during 1999-2000.
OLS regressions for the entire sample
In Table 4 , we reported regression results using a sample of 196 IPOs from 1996-2000 for which DMG, CSFB, or SSB was a bookrunner. In Table 5 , we use the full sample of 2,285 IPOs from 1996-2000 for which complete data is available. Furthermore, we add one additional explanatory variable, a top-tier underwriter dummy variable. We did not include this in the Table 4 regressions because DMG, CSFB, and SSB are all top-tier underwriters. The top-tier dummy variable is assigned a value of one (zero otherwise) if at least one of the lead underwriters has a CarterManaster (1990) ranking of 8 or above on a 1-9 scale. As many authors have noted, the choice of a top-tier lead underwriter is endogenous. Loughran and Ritter (2004) , however, show that using an instrument for top-tier status does not materially affect the parameter estimate. Table   4 and suggest that underpricing due to spinning is higher in the bubble period than in the pre-bubble period.
To summarize, the regression results in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with the spinning hypothesis prediction that, holding everything else constant, IPOs whose executives are being spun are more underpriced. Furthermore, the magnitude is economically significant. The Table 5 regression results also support the analyst lust hypothesis, confirming the findings of Cliff and Denis Using these results, we can estimate the amount of underpricing that can be attributed to the analyst lust and spinning hypotheses, especially for the bubble period. In our sample of 2,285 IPOs, twenty percent of the IPOs in the bubble period received coverage from an all-star analyst and the coefficient on the all-star dummy from row 5 of Table 5 is 18.45, suggesting that analyst lust can account for 3.7% of the average underpricing in that period. If we estimate twenty percent of all IPOs in the bubble period are being spun, then the coefficient of 27.52 in row 5 of Table 5 translates into 5.5% additional underpricing due to spinning. Combining both analyst lust and spinning yields 9.2% in underpricing in the bubble period. Thus, of the 65% average underpricing in the bubble period, we estimate that spinning together with analyst lust can explain about 9% of the 65% average underpricing.
Endogeneity issues
In this subsection, we present two alternative stories to explain the relation between underpricing and spinning, based on the assumption that the causality goes from underpricing to spinning, rather than from spinning to underpricing as we have assumed. The first alternative is that underwriters might have a higher propensity to spin the executives of IPOs with high first-day runups as a way of compensating the executives for leaving a large amount of money on the table. If this is the case, then causality is going from high returns to spinning, rather than from spinning to high returns.
There are several reasons to doubt this story. First, we have not seen or heard of any evidence that hot IPO allocations were withheld from the executives of firms with low first-day returns. In fact, several of the firms in our dataset that were spun had a negative first-day return. Second, the promise of IPO allocations was generally made at the time of underwriter selection before a firm went public, and the promises were not conditioned on first-day performance, as far as we know.
Although the Friend of Frank account list does not indicate at what stage in the going public process
each account is opened, we can see from the regulatory settlement quoted in Appendix A-1 and from indirect evidence that the accounts are opened at an early stage, before the companies went public.
Furthermore, the March 2000 Excel file that we have shows several executives that had just opened a
Friend of Frank account, although their companies never did go public, as many IPOs were withdrawn after the tech bubble began to collapse after March 2000.
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As a second alternative story that relates spinning to underpricing, suppose that some IPOs are expected to be severely underpriced for some unobserved exogenous reason. These IPOs are the most attractive underwriting clients, so underwriters would want to spin these executives to win the mandate even if spinning has no effect on the subsequent offer price. This suggests that the unobserved exogenous factor is affecting both the decision to spin and the level of underpricing. If this unobserved factor is not accounted for in the underpricing regression, then the spin variable will be endogenous.
To address the possibility that spinning may be endogenous, we conduct a two-stage estimation procedure similar to those used in Lowry and Shu (2002) In choosing variables that can be used to identify spinning, but not underpricing, we consider the underwriter's motivation for offering spinning and the issuer's likelihood of accepting spinning.
Conceptually, underwriters are more likely to offer spinning to firms that are in greater need of investment banking services in the future such as for completing a follow-on offering. To proxy for the likelihood of using external financing, we use the ratio of capital expenditure/assets from the fiscal year prior to the IPO and the growth rate of sales over the two most recent fiscal years. 21 Also it may be more effective to offer spinning to executives and directors who have more power and influence in the firm. Since we do not know which executives would be spun ex-ante, we use the fraction of all insiders' pre-IPO holdings as a proxy for their expected influence.
In addition, personal relations may play a role since some executives were not offered spinning because they did not get alone with Frank Quattrone, as implied by the name of the account:
"Friend of Frank." To proxy for personal ties, we use a dummy variable instate to account for the physical proximity of the issuing firm's headquarter to the location of the underwriter's spinning desk since physical closeness may increase the amount of contacts and foster personal relations. 22 As for issuers, those with low ethical standards should be more willing to accept side payments. To 21 For firms without sales data in year t-1 or t-2, their sales growth numbers are set to the median sales growth of 0.869. Conversely, the test of significance of the three identifying variables for underpricing suggests that these variables are significantly related to underpricing (p-value=0.0001), while not related to spinning (p-value=0.848).
The primary variable of interest is the instrumented spinning variable. In the last column of Table 6 , when endogeneity is controlled for, the coefficient on the spinning instrument is 22.69 with a t-statistic of 2.01. Since this coefficient is similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 5 , it suggests that the relation between spinning and underpricing is significant even controlling for the possibility of endogeneity. Furthermore, in the third column, the underpricing instrument's coefficient of 0.001 (z=0.22) suggests that underpricing does not cause spinning.
Overall, these results are consistent with the spinning hypothesis in Loughran and Ritter (2004) , which posits that executives who receive side payments from underwriters put less emphasis on maximizing the proceeds from their IPO, resulting in the IPO being more underpriced.
23 From the Glass-Lewis & Co.'s Yellow Card Trend Alert as of March 2007 and SEC filings, we classify eight of our 196 firms as having backdated options based on evidence that they have either charged or restated previously unrecognized expenses related to misdated stock options. For the other 188 firms, we calculate their probability of backdating based on the number of unique at the money option grants and the number of these grants with an exercise price at the lowest price of the month using data from Thompson Reuter's Insider Filings database before August 29, 2002, when SOX revised the option grant reporting rules. For each firm, the probability of backdating is calculated as the Bayesian probability of backdating conditional on observing a number of option grants at the lowest price of the month out of a total number of option grants for the firm. The probability measure is closely based on Heron and Lie (2006), Bebchuk et al. (2007) and Carow et al. (2009) . The low ethics dummy equals one (zero otherwise) if the firm is one of the eight firms engaged in option backdating or if the firm has a probability of backdating greater than 95%.
The Effect of Spinning on Subsequent Investment Banking Mandates
In this section, we test the hypothesis that spinning affects an issuer's probability of using the same underwriter for its subsequent investment banking business. In Table 7 , we present the loyalty statistics for the usage of investment banking service in the post-IPO period for 196 IPOs by DMG, CSFB, or SSB. We limit the post-IPO transactions under examination to those completed before the end of 2001 since it is difficult to assess the effect of spinning in later deals, with our spinning data ending in 2000. In addition, we focus on issuing companies' first post-IPO transactions, since the effect of spinning on decisions is expected to deteriorate over time.
Panel A of (2004) report. For issuers that are subject to spinning, 17 out of 18 companies used the same lead underwriter for both their IPO and first SEO, a switch rate of only 6%. The switch rate of 31% for companies whose executives are not spun is more than five times the 6% switch rate for companies whose executives are being spun. The difference in switch rates, assuming independence, has a p-value of 0.037.
For the first non-SEO transactions in Panel B, 47% of spinners are loyal to their IPO underwriters, which is a larger percentage than the 37% of non-spinners being loyal to their IPO underwriters. This 10% difference in the loyalty rates is smaller than the 25% difference for the first SEOs and is statistically insignificant. We conjecture that the effect of spinning is weaker in this case partly because non-SEO deals tend to use evaluative criteria for choosing investment bankers that are different from the criteria used for IPOs and SEOs. For instance, they may prefer an investment banking firm with more merger and acquisition experience in their industry.
Overall, Table 7 provides univariate evidence supporting the hypothesis that spinning has an effect on the choice of underwriter for post-IPO transactions, with the effect being more pronounced for the first SEOs than non-SEOs. In unreported results, we have conducted a series of probit regressions to predict loyalty for the first SEO, controlling for up to seven variables that might be related to switching propensities. The effect of spinning on loyalty is economically and statistically significant in all specifications and the increase in the probability of being loyal due to spinning based on predicted values is around 25%, consistent with the univariate results reported in Panel A of is the offer price observed, and 0.2268 is the coefficient on spinning from the regression in row 3 of Table 4 , expressed as a decimal rather than a percentage. The money left on the table due to spinning is then estimated to be $952 million in total, an average of $17 million per spinning firm.
For the 36 of the 56 IPOs whose executives were spun for which we have allocation information, the average per firm spinning profit accruing to the executives reported in Table 3 is approximately $1.3 million, which is less than 8% of the $17 million incremental money left on the table due to spinning. Thus, the executives gained $1.3 million on average at the expense of the shareholders, who lost $17 million per issue from spinning. These numbers illustrate the magnitude of agency problems that can arise from putting the decision rights at a corporation into the hands of a few executives. The underwriters successfully co-opted these people, but gave them only a small slice of the pie. While the benefit that the executives received is non-trivial, the loss to the shareholders is far greater.
Since the executives being spun are usually also shareholders of the company, we collect ownership holding data from IPO prospectus for the 146 officers and directors. On average, the executives being spun hold 23% of the total shares in their company before the IPO, which means they have lost $3.9 million in foregone proceeds due to spinning (23% of the incremental $17 million left on the table), and gained only $1.3 million in return. At first glance it appears that the harm executives inflicted on themselves through excessive dilution exceeds their private benefits. It should be kept in mind, however, that most of these executives had very undiversified and illiquid portfolios consisting primarily of company stock and options, with much of the stock subject to lockup provisions and stock options subject to vesting restrictions. Many of them had significant paper wealth, but cash income that was imperfectly correlated with their company's stock price apparently had considerable appeal.
Costs and benefits for the underwriters
We calculate the profit from spinning for the three underwriters, DMG, CSFB, and SSB, as ‫݀݁݁ܿݎܲ‬ , measures the incremental profit gained from future deals due to spinning, where ߨ ሺܵ ҧ ሻ is the change in the probability of choosing the same underwriter due to spinning, ݃ · ‫݀݁݁ܿݎܲ‬ is the gross spread revenue, and ‫ܯܲ‬ is the fraction of the nth deal's revenue that is profit. The last term, ߛܵ ҧ , is the opportunity cost of spinning, measured as the underwriter's fractional share of the money left on the table, ߛ, times the aggregate first day profit for all the executives being spun, ܵ ҧ . This last term represents the soft dollar revenue that would have been earned if these shares had been allocated to rent-seeking institutional investors rather than the executives. underwriter, with total fees to the three underwriters of $207 million. The typically loyalty rate is estimated to be 69% and, due to spinning, the loyalty rate increases to 94% based on underwriters due to spinning ($207 million/0.94=$220 million in SEO fees accruing to all underwriters, times the 25% higher market share due to the spinning-induced loyalty) to the incumbent underwriters. For the post-IPO investment banking deals, we are only counting the first SEOs, which means our estimates of the underwriters' spinning profits are a lower bound. The opportunity cost of spinning, ߛܵ ҧ is estimated to be $25.5 million, calculated as the underwriter's 35% fractional share of the money left on the table received from soft dollars times the aggregate first day profit for all the executives being spun of $72.8 million for 56 firms, using $1.3 million as the firm level first day profit average. Thus, the total pre-tax profit from spinning for the three underwriters in this case is $262 million, which is $333m-$62m+$16.5m-$25.5m=$262 million. It should be noted however, that this number does not include the cost of subsequent regulatory settlements.
In unreported sensitivity analysis, we investigate how underwriters' total profit from spinning changes by varying ߛ and the SEO profit margin. We find that except for very low values of ߛ, where the cost of spinning outweighs the benefits of spinning, the underwriter's profits from spinning are positive and substantial. Given the conservative nature of our assumptions, these calculations suggest that spinning can indeed be profitable for underwriters in the absence of significant regulatory penalties.
Conclusion
Spinning, the practice of allocating hot IPOs to corporate executives with the purpose of affecting corporate investment banking decisions, previously has not been empirically studied in the finance literature. The relation between IPO spinning and both IPO underpricing and the choice of underwriter for subsequent offerings has not been explored. In this paper, we use a unique dataset to examine the economic consequences of IPO spinning by measuring the effect of IPO spinning on the underpricing of IPOs and the choice of underwriter for subsequent public offerings.
The spinning hypothesis states that executives are less likely to seek the highest offer price if they receive side payments from underwriters. We find that holding everything else constant, IPOs in which the executives are being spun are underpriced about 23% more than other IPOs. This result is consistent with the spinning hypothesis in Loughran and Ritter (2004) . We estimate that the combined effects of issuers seeking all-star analyst coverage and spinning, rather than exclusively seeking IPO proceeds maximization, can account for approximately 9% of the 65% average underpricing during the 1999-2000 bubble period.
In addition, we find that spinning is negatively related to the probability of switching underwriters between the IPO and the first SEO. Our analysis suggests that firms that are involved in spinning are dramatically less likely to switch underwriters for their next public equity offering: 31% of issuers whose executives were not spun switched underwriters, whereas only 6% of issuers whose executives were spun switched underwriters.
In summary, we find that spinning affected not only IPO underpricing, but also the awarding of mandates on subsequent investment banking deals. This suggests that the spinning of corporate executives by investment bankers accomplished its purpose: it affected the corporate decisions of executives who received hot IPO allocations.
Lastly, it is worth noting that since 2001 the spinning of corporate executives has largely ceased in the U.S. This is due to both a regulatory crackdown and a dearth of hot IPOs to allocate. The sample in rows 1, 2, and 3 includes 196 firms taken public by 1) Deutsche Morgan Grenfell (DMG) from July 1, 1996 to June 30, 1998 for which the company's industry is technology or internet-related; 2) Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) from July 1, 1998 to December 31, 2000 for which the company's industry is technology or internet-related; or 3) Salomon Brothers from January 1, 1996 to November 1997, Smith Barney from July 1, 1997 to November 1997, and Salomon Smith Barney from November 1997 to December 31, 2000 (collectively, SSB). The 1996-1998 and 1999-2000 subperiods have average Winsorized first-day returns of 16.5% and 75.3%, respectively. The dependent variable in all regressions is the percentage first-day return from the offer price to the first-day closing price, Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles (using the entire 1996-2000 IPO population cutoffs). Ln(assets) is the natural logarithm of the pre-issue book value of assets, expressed in millions of dollars of 2003 purchasing power using the CPI. Ln(1+age) is the natural logarithm of one plus the IPO year minus the founding year. The tech dummy takes a value of one (zero otherwise) if the firm is in the technology business, and the internet dummy is similarly defined. Share overhang is the ratio of retained shares to the public float (the number of shares issued). The VC dummy takes a value of one (zero otherwise) if the IPO was backed by venture capital. The All-star analyst dummy takes a value of one if one or more of the bookrunners had an Institutional Investor all-star analyst (top 3) cover the stock within 12 months of the IPO. The spin dummy takes a value of one (zero otherwise) if the IPO is one of the 56 IPOs during 1996-2000 for which the executives of the IPO firm received IPO allocations from DMG, CSFB, or SSB, and one or more of these three underwriters was a bookrunner on their IPO. 
Spinning at DMG and CSFB
Perhaps the most egregious spinning was that done by Frank Quattrone, the head of technology investment banking at Deutsche Morgan Grenfell (DMG) from mid-1996 to mid-1998, and then the head of technology investment banking at Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) from mid-1998 until his forced resignation on March 4, 2003. When Quattrone left DMG, almost all of the employees reporting to him also moved to CSFB. Indeed, the exodus was so total that DMG was left with an empty office building in Silicon Valley, which DMG promptly subleased to CSFB. As a result, the employees who switched employers were able to continue working without even having to move their desks. From approximately March 1999 through April 2001, Technology PCS improperly allocated "hot" IPO stock to executives of investment banking clients and improperly managed the purchase and sale of that stock through discretionary trading accounts. CSFB's Technology Group gave improper preferential treatment to these company executives with the belief and expectation that the executives would steer investment banking business for their companies to CSFB… Pitchbooks used by the Technology Group to win an issuer's investment banking business referenced the discretionary accounts. Consistent with those references and representations made at "pitches," an issuer had to award CSFB its investment banking mandate before the issuer's officers were afforded the opportunity to open discretionary accounts and given access to IPO shares by CSFB. Likewise, CSFB considered ways to reduce or eliminate IPO allocations to executives who changed employment and were no longer affiliated with those companies.
Once Technology Group received a mandate, Technology PCS established discretionary accounts for executives who were considered to be "strategic." "Strategic" was commonly understood by Quattrone and Technology PCS managers to refer to the overall business 26 See Elkind and Gimein (2001) . 27 See Section 5 of the NASD Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent (AWC) No. CAF030026 between the NASD and CSFB on April 21, 2003. The AWC states that "CSFB hereby accepts and consents, without admitting or denying the allegations and findings, …the following findings by NASD". The AWC can be found at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/enforcement/documents/enforcement/p007670.pdf relationship CSFB had with the issuer, including potential future investment banking business. The head of Technology PCS defined "strategic" as "senior decision makers" at existing or prospective investment banking clients of the Technology Group who could influence their companies' choice of investment banker.
Technology PCS did not apply standard CSFB qualification standards (i.e. assets under management, trading revenue production, length of the brokerage relationship, etc.) for the opening of these discretionary accounts. Instead, the decision was based largely on the executive's position and influence in the company…. These discretionary accounts were limited to the purchase and sale of stock purchased through CSFB IPOs. The account holders were not permitted to buy or sell other securities in these accounts.
…In some cases, all the shares allocated to discretionary accounts were sold for a profit on the IPO's first day of trading in the secondary market.
Spinning at SSB
Salomon Smith Barney (SSB) spun corporate executives as part of a strategy for attracting and retaining investment banking business from their companies. Internal SSB documents repeatedly state or imply that company executives should be given preferential treatment in their personal finances because these executives have the power to direct corporate business to SSB. For example, the July 10, 1997 memo from internal auditor Bob Zinnel to Howard Kerbel at Salomon Brothers states:
28
Most of PWMG's [Private Wealth Management Group's] clients have been brought into the Firm through Investment Banking relationships. In many respects, PWMG acts as a conduit in keeping client relationships alive which also helps to bring in more business to the Investment Bank.
The most infamous executive that SSB spun was Bernie Ebbers, the former CEO of WorldCom, who is currently serving 25 years in Federal prison for securities fraud. Ebbers and WorldCom are not in our sample because the predecessor company of WorldCom, LDDS, had gone public before our sample period starts in 1996. LDDS became public in 1989 through a reverse merger with a publicly traded company, Advantage Companies, Inc. Ebbers received allocations of 21 IPOs from SSB during 1996-2001 with first-day profits of $5,603,665. During this time period, WorldCom generated $115,488,000 in investment banking fees for SSB. 
Appendix Table A-2: Variable Definitions
There are two sets of data. The first set consists of 2,285 U.S. operating firm IPOs from 1996-2000 for which the offer price is at least $5.00 and complete data on all of the variables is available. Unit offers, ADRs, banks and S&Ls, and partnerships offers have been excluded. The second set consists of 196 IPOs (a subset of the 2,285 IPOs) that are underwritten by Deutsche Morgan Grenfell (DMG) from July 1, 1996 to June 30, 1998; the technology group of Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) from July 1, 1998 to December 31, 2000; or Salomon Brothers from January 1, 1996 to November 1997, Smith Barney from July 1, 1997 to November 1997, and Salomon Smith Barney from November 1997 to December 31, 2000 (collectively, SSB). All dollar values are expressed in terms of 2003 purchasing power using the Consumer Price Index. Compustat for location information -36.2%
Low Ethics Dummy Low ethics dummy equals one (zero otherwise) if there is evidence that the firm engaged in option backdating or if the firm has a probability of backdating greater than 95%. The probability of backdating is calculated based on the number of unique at the money option grants and the number of these grants with an exercise price at the lowest price of the month using data from Insider Filings database before August 29, 2002. For each firm, the probability of backdating is calculated as the Bayesian probability of backdating conditional on observing a number of option grants at the lowest price of the month out of the total number of option grants for the firm. 
